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By transcendental aesthetic, Kant means “the science of all principles of a 
priori sensibility” (A 21/B 35).1 These, he argues, are the laws that properly 
direct our judgments of taste (B 35 – 36 fn.), i.e. our aesthetic judgments as we 
ordinarily understand that notion in the context of contemporary art. Thus the 
first part of the Critique of Pure Reason, entitled the Transcendental Aesthetic, 
enumerates the necessary presuppositions of, among other things, our ability 
to make empirical judgments about particular works of art. These 
presuppositions are sensible rather than intellectual because on Kant’s view, 
all intellection that considers objects of any kind, whether abstract or concrete, 
must at base connect to actual, material objects with which we come into 
direct contact; and this we can do only through sensibility (A 19/B 33). Thus 
the following discussion explores what Kant claims must be true of us in 
order to make the sorts of aesthetic judgments we make, rather than any 
particular class or quality of aesthetic judgments itself. On Kant’s view, what 
must be true of us in order to make aesthetic judgments is not different from 
what must be true of us in order to make any other kind of judgment about 
empirical objects.  
This last point is worth emphasizing, in order to correct an interpretation 
of Kant’s account of aesthetic judgment in the Critique of Judgment2 that 
wrongly reads Kant as claiming that aesthetic judgments do not have to 
satisfy the same basic requirements of judgment that any other kind of 
judgment also must satisfy, such as the synthetic subsumption of such objects 
under certain necessary and hard-wired concepts of understanding, the 
internal coherence of such judgments with other, non-aesthetic ones of a more 
abstract and comprehensive character, the unified consciousness within which 
such judgments are intelligibly made, and the like. Of course Kant recognizes 
the special character of aesthetic judgments and unpacks it in the third 
Critique. But as we see above, he also states clearly, in the very first paragraph 
of the first Critique, that aesthetic judgment is merely one species of judgment, 
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 Immanuel Kant, Kritik der Reinen Vernunft, Kant’s gesammelte Schriften, herausg. 
königlich Preußischen bzw. Deutschen Akademie der Wissenschaften (Berlin, 1911; 
New York: Walter de Gruyter), Vols. 3 [B Edition] and 4 [A Edition]; Kritik der Reinen 
Vernunft, Herausg. Raymund Schmidt (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1976). Page 
citations are in the text, and follow the standard A and B Edition paginations. 
Translations from the German are mine. 
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 Immanuel Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft, Kant’s gesammelte Schriften, herausg. königlich 
Preußischen bzw. Deutschen Akademie der Wissenschaften (Berlin, 1911; New York: 
Walter de Gruyter), Volume 5; Kritik der Urteilskraft, herausg. von Karl Vorländer 
(Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1974). 
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all of which must satisfy the necessary conditions he enumerates in the 
subsequent sections of this chronologically prior work. Examination of those 
subsequent sections shows that Kant does not think it is possible to make 
judgments of any kind unless these conditions are satisfied. I focus on the 
implications of these conditions for aesthetic judgment specifically. But it will 
become clear in what follows that these implications certainly are not confined 
to aesthetic judgments alone. 
Kant begins the Transcendental Aesthetic with the claim that through 
intuition, we stand in unmediated relation to objects (A 19/B 33). In Kant’s 
technical vocabulary, intuition is a precognitive, sensory process through 
which we situate ourselves spatiotemporally in relation to objects, both 
internal and external (A 23/B 37). In the case of internal objects, we organize 
sense data linearly in time, ensuring that our internal mental representations 
of objects and the parts of objects we represent proceed in systematic 
succession. For example, I remember the living room of my old house by 
calling up successive images of the west wall, the north wall, the east wall, 
then the south wall; and then the east wall once more, if something of interest 
there then returns to my memory. In the case of external objects, we also 
organize sense data spatially, by projecting and locating the object we 
construct from them at some particular point outside of ourselves, and thus 
defining a spatial relation between it and us. Every such external, spatial 
relationship is also implicitly a temporal one of duration or change, according 
to the enduring or temporary state of the objects we thus locate; whereas 
internal relations are only temporal, because we locate them inside rather than 
outside of our own material and sensory boundaries as subjects. Unmediated 
means, roughly, that there is no intermediary between us and the object with 
which we are in direct contact. The subject-object relationship is in the 
intuitive sense direct and unmediated in that we do not interpose any concept 
or theory or interpretation of the object between ourselves and it; we come 
into direct contact with it as it is, not as we might identify, interpret or 
describe it.  
 In intuition, the subject and object thus related are both what 
contemporary philosophers of language would call concrete particulars, i.e. 
actual, specific, concrete things, rather than examples of concepts or members 
of classes or subjects of interpretation or theory. They are the metaphysical 
kind of thing we can physically grab – or, in the case of particularly vivid 
objects of imagination or memory, that can grab us. So the unmediated quality 
of our sensory relationship to such things is interdependent with their 
concrete particularity: it is because such things, as intuited, are only 
themselves and not any further property or conjunction of properties that we 
might then ascribe to them that no such further concepts, classes, or 
interpretations interpose themselves as mediators between us and them. 
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 Kant argues that intuition alone is insufficient for knowledge (A 51/ B 
75), and even for consciousness (A 99 – 104). Kant’s claim that intuition is 
insufficient for knowledge follows directly from his definition of knowledge, 
which requires conceptualization, i.e. the ability to ascribe properties to 
concrete particulars (A 106). On Kant’s view, we cannot be said to know 
something unless we can identify it conceptually in some way. However, Kant 
also thinks that unless we can thus conceptualize a concrete particular as 
being of a certain basic kind – i.e. at least minimally as an object, it cannot 
enter a subject’s unified consciousness at all; but instead must remain 
“nothing but a blind play of representations, that is, less even than a 
dream.”(A 112). Kant’s idea here is that in order to be conscious of a concrete 
particular, we have to be able to recognize it as in some way familiar to us – in 
shape, or color, or texture, or function, or role, or something that enables us to 
connect it with the rest of our conscious experience, not only 
spatiotemporally, but also at higher cognitive levels.  
 This thesis is not implausible. It often happens that we can be looking 
right at something without seeing it, in case we are not primed to see it, and 
sometimes even if we are. This happens often enough with familiar, 
pedestrian objects such as keys or pencils. It happens even more frequently 
with conceptually unfamiliar or anomalous concrete particulars that are 
foreign to our conceptual scheme. This is the kind of thing such that, in order 
to visually cognize it at all, we first must be educated to see it, or – literally – 
to re-cognize it: We must be introduced to it; its defining properties must be 
verbally pointed out to us with considerable fanfare; we must have its 
function or significance explained to us – so that the concrete particular that 
literally did not exist for us before this process of acculturation now becomes 
recognizable – as a sculpture, or a scalpel, or a cloud chamber, or a person – 
minimally deserving of our attention. Once we become familiar enough with 
the thing to situate it within our pre-existing conceptual scheme, and extend 
our pre-existing conceptual scheme sufficiently to accommodate it, the 
presence of this concrete particular then calls forth the relevant concepts, 
relations, and associations which in turn enable us to register it in 
consciousness and behave appropriately toward it. From Kant’s thesis it 
would follow that without that familiarizing and acculturating process that 
enables us to conceptualize the concrete particular in recognizable terms, we 
cannot be aware of it at all. 
Kant’s thesis thus implies an interesting trade-off. Through intuition we 
can have direct and unmediated contact with a concrete particular, as it is, 
without the interference of any form of conceptual indoctrination – so long as 
we are prepared to relinquish the ability to theorize about it, to analyze and 
explain it in such a way as to situate it as an object of knowledge within our 
conceptual scheme. Alternately, through understanding we can perform all of 
these discursive functions that enable us intellectually to comprehend the 
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object – so long as we are prepared to relinquish our direct and unmediated 
contact with it. But we cannot do both at once. 
Traditional practices conjoined with such Indian philosophies as Yoga, 
Samkhya, Vedanta, or Buddhism illustrate how we might do each 
successively. The ancient philosophy of Samkhya that provides the 
metaphysical foundation for Yogic meditation offers a particularly rich and 
rigorous account of how, through the discipline of intensive meditation on a 
concrete particular at increasingly advanced levels, we gradually learn how to 
dismantle the rigid conceptual indoctrination that interferes with our direct 
and unmediated grasp of the reality that lies beyond the boundaries of the 
individual self.3 But it rightly cautions that in the process of achieving this 
brand of insight into the true nature of concrete particulars, we eventually 
must leave the familiar activities of intellective conceptualization behind; and 
warns us not to undertake this advanced practice until we are physically and 
psychologically ready to do this. Ordinarily this does not occur until we are 
fully comfortable, at the deepest psychological level, with the reality of our 
own imminent death. I shall return to this point later. 
At the other end of the chronological continuum, we celebrate childhood 
precisely for its as yet relatively unencumbered access to that reality, and to 
the creative imagination and insight into concrete particulars that as yet 
porous and inchoate boundaries of the individual self afford. In such fables as 
“The Emperor’s New Clothes,” we enshrine the value of an intuitive contact 
with material reality that is so immediate and uncorrupted by the conceptual 
indoctrination of culture, politics and hierarchies of power and control that 
unvarnished empirical observations which issue from such intuition carry 
more power and authority than any attempt at indoctrination could ever 
achieve. But the price of such innocence is, of course, the ignorance of these 
more complex social relationships that it precludes. Our natural curiosity to 
learn more about them, combined with the more or less automatic forces of 
acculturation and maturation, compel us to leave this intuitive immediacy 
                                                
3
 Samkhya Karika of Isvara Krsna, trans. Swami Virupakshananda (Madras: Sri 
Ramakrishna Math, 1995). A particularly faithful appropriation into Yoga psychology 
can be found in Yoga Philosophy of Patanjali, trans. from Sanskrit Swami Hariharananda 
Aranya; trans. into English P. N. Mukerji (Albany: State University of New York Press, 
1983), but this commentary is hard going. A more reader-friendly but less rigorous 
approach can be found in Yogasutra of Patanjali with the Commentary of Vyasa, trans. 
Bangali Baba (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1982). Two very friendly popularizations are 
How to Know God: The Yoga Aphorisms of Patanjali, trans. and commentary by Swami 
Prabhavananda and Christopher Isherwood (New York: Mentor, 1969) and Yoga, 
Discipline of Freedom: The Yoga Sutra Attributed to Patanjali, trans. Barbara Stoler Miller 
(Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1995). 
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behind as we develop – rarely if ever suspecting, until it is much to late to 
retrieve it, the Faustian bargain into which we have implicitly entered. 
For the most discontented and ambitious of truth-seekers, neither 
alternative is enough. It is not enough to enjoy intuition and understanding, 
or understanding and intuition consecutively, in either order of succession. 
Those of us who work at spinning a theory of everything crave unmediated 
intuitive contact with the concrete particulars that will confirm it, and full 
scholarly respectability for that theory demands some such empirical 
verification. Similarly, those of us who work at shedding our theories of 
everything in order to achieve that direct and unmediated contact crave an 
explanation that will make the resulting experience rationally intelligible, and 
full psychological adaptation to that experience requires this. These are the 
two horns of a dilemma: Each end of the continuum between intuition and 
understanding impels us toward the other; and each approach to the other 
impels us to try to recover what we have had to sacrifice in order to make the 
journey. We instinctively want, and need, both; yet each makes the other 
impossible in principle. Or so it seems. 
Contemporary artistic practice poses an interesting case against which to 
test the soundness of Kant’s thesis and the dilemma it appears to engender. 
Contemporary artists bear a special relationship to intuition itself, in Kant’s 
technical sense, because they have unmediated intuitive access to the material 
objects they create. Artists conjure spatiotemporally discrete concrete 
particulars in thought and in reality that need not depend on any specific 
conceptualizations of them; and that may simply come up in consciousness, 
present themselves fully developed with respect to detail, with an urgency 
that demands their physical realization in advance of any conceptual 
interpretation that might enable one to explain, even to oneself, why one feels 
driven to do so. Or one might conjure such an object through an entirely 
spontaneous and unplanned physical process of exploring the potential of a 
material or configuration of materials, such that the end result may have the 
same degree of urgency and importance for its maker, independent of her 
ability to verbalize why it does or how she arrived at it. 
One way of resolving the dilemma in this case is simply to conclude that, 
at least according to Kant’s technical definition of knowledge, artists do not 
know what they are doing. They just do it, and allot to the critics and art 
historians the task of figuring out what it means and why they bothered. This 
comforting interpretation, too, has some plausibility: Many artists do, indeed, 
find it extremely difficult to theorize about what they are doing while they are 
doing it. It may take years, if ever, before an artist can put together an 
intelligible commentary about his work that helps it to make sense to 
everyone else; and surely this is in part to be explained by precisely that 
direct, intimate and unmediated relationship between the artist and the 
concrete particular he fashions. That particular is too complicated and 
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overwhelming, too cryptic and multifaceted in its connections and 
associations, to be captured accurately in even the most fine-grained analysis 
– simplistic text-book descriptions and classifications of it notwithstanding.  
Yet the purposeful character of the artistic process belies such a facile 
resolution, and demands, at the very least, Russell’s distinction between 
knowing that and knowing how – i.e. between knowledge by description or 
propositional knowledge on the one hand; and practical or applied 
knowledge by acquaintance on the other. The counterclaim then would be 
that although artists may not have propositional knowledge about the objects 
they make (at least not right away), they do have practical, hands-on 
knowledge of precisely the sort in which the intuitive relation to concrete 
particulars consists. 
However, this distinction will not resolve the dilemma engendered by 
Kant’s thesis, for several reasons. First, Kant rejects the distinction between 
knowing that and knowing how, and in fact reduces the first to the second. 
Propositional knowledge of facts, for Kant, is equivalent to the practical ability 
to do things – specifically, to do things mentally with concepts: to organize 
sense data and the representations of objects and properties in a certain way 
and according to certain rules that ensure their objective status as objects of 
third-personal empirical investigation. In fact, concepts for Kant just are rules 
– or “functions” to use his term – for organizing the representations supplied 
by intuition systematically (A 68/B 93 – A 70/B 95, A 76/B 102 – A 80/B 106, 
A 106).4  Second, it is part of Kant’s thesis that we cannot even be aware of 
such bare intuitive processes. Concrete particulars that do not fit the familiar 
categories by which we make the world and ourselves intelligible have 
nowhere in consciousness to land, and therefore float around outside it, 
unmoored in one’s unconscious.  
Third, Russell’s distinction does not explain the purposive character of 
artistic production, i.e. that one works long and hard and deliberately and 
reflectively to produce a spatiotemporally discrete concrete particular that has 
precisely the form it ends up having, independent of its compatibility with 
prevailing conceptual schemes or theories. This is a matter not merely (and 
sometimes not at all) of practical skill, but rather of vision – of a kind of 
knowledge that acquaints one directly with a concrete particular to which one 
has a form of access that is intuitive without necessarily being either 
                                                
4
 I discuss Kant’s notion of a concept as a function at greater length in "Kant on the 
Objectivity of the Moral Law," in Andrews Reath, Barbara Herman and Christine M. 
Korsgaard, Eds., Reclaiming the History of Ethics: Essays for John Rawls (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997), 240-269; and at even greater length in Kant’s 
Metaethics: First Critique Foundations (in process), from which both this article and the 
present discussion are excerpted.  
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conceptual or practical in any behavioral sense. When one is engaged in the 
process of bringing a work to material realization, there is something that one 
knows: not necessarily that something is the case, and not necessarily how to 
do something, but rather when the work is truly finished, when its final form 
has been achieved. This involves both knowing that it at a particular moment 
satisfies one’s implicit criteria for completion, and also knowing how to edge 
it to the point at which it does. 
I propose that a deeper understanding of the dilemma that Kant’s thesis 
implies lies elsewhere in Kant’s architectonic – specifically, in a closer look at 
the conditions Kant enumerates for the unity of the self. This will take us to 
those parts of the Transcendental Analytic, and in particular of the 
Transcendental Deduction in A and B, in which Kant effectively rethinks the 
independence of intuition and understanding and finally offers an account in 
which the two are interdependent. From here I go on to question the extent to 
which these enumerated conditions of subjective unity can be said to hold – in 
the process of artistic production on the one hand, and in yogic meditation on 
the other. I conclude that Kant’s thesis and its implications are consistent and 
correct, and that neither contemporary artistic practice nor yogic meditation 
provides a counterexample. 
At A 89/B 122 to A 91/B 123, Kant entertains the possibility that concrete 
particulars might appear in consciousness without being subject to the hard-
wired categories of understanding that construct the objective empirical 
world of nature for us. This thought experiment is consistent with his mode of 
exposition in the Transcendental Aesthetic, for there he has developed an 
account of space and time as forms of our intuition, and of the objects we 
situate therein, that seems to make no reference to any requirements of 
conceptualization. It would seem that we could directly and consciously intuit 
a concrete particular as spatiotemporally discrete, independently of any 
further cognitive conditions it might have to satisfy in order to register in our 
awareness, and independently of any further judgments we might or might 
not make about it.  
If it were the case that we could be directly aware of concrete particulars 
without first having to exercise our capacity of judgment and understanding 
even in order to register them in conscious awareness, it might then seem 
possible to subject them, once there, directly to judgments of taste. Such 
judgments then would have a very unusual character indeed. They would be 
able to subsume a concrete particular as it was in itself directly and 
disinterestedly under concepts of beauty, form, balance, dimension, and the 
like, without the intervening necessity of first identifying it with regard to 
quantity, properties, material status, causal relations, or any more abstract 
theoretical concepts with which these are interconnected (A 651/B 679). If 
judgments of taste functioned in this way, they would not only fail to connect 
the concrete particular object of aesthetic judgment with the empirical and 
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social context of relationships and associations within which it was 
identifiable as a plausible candidate of such judgments, i.e. as a work of art. 
They would fail even to identify the concrete particular as an object. 
Judgments of taste of this kind would be not only very peculiar. They would 
be incoherent. 
Kant’s Transcendental Deduction of the Categories is intended to, among 
other things, demonstrate why this thought experiment itself is ultimately 
incoherent: In order for something even to constitute an identifiable empirical 
object of consciousness of any kind, whether mental or physical, we must 
understand it as, for example, a certain quantity of thing (one, many, 
everything); it must have certain sensible qualities that enable us to fix its type 
and degree of existence (Kant identifies the existence of the object with the fact 
that we can intuit sense data from it at B 138-139); it must stand in certain 
basic relations to other things (its own properties, its causes and effects, its 
causal interconnections with other bearers of properties); and it must have a 
specific modality (as a possibility, an actuality or a necessity) (A 80/B 106). No 
concrete particular that fails to satisfy any of these four requirements is 
recognizable as an empirical object at all, at least as we understand that 
notion. 
Accordingly, we find Kant in both the A and B Deductions qualifying and 
revising the account of spatiotemporally discrete objects he offered in the 
Transcendental Aesthetic (A 99-100; B 136 fn; B 144 fn; B 150-152; B 154 and fn; 
B 156; B 160 fn; B 160-1625), and it is clear why he must. For even the notion of 
spatiotemporal discreteness presupposes satisfaction of the category-class of 
quantity. Even the notion of spatiotemporal location presupposes satisfaction 
of the category-class of relation. Even the notion of the object as sensible 
presupposes satisfaction of the category-class of quality. And even the notion 
of our bearing a direct and unmediated relation to it presupposes satisfaction 
of the category-class of modality. Hence the forms of intuition, space and 
time, are not independent of our ability to identify, conceptualize, and 
theorize about concrete particulars after all; and Kant’s claim that we stand in 
direct and unmediated relation to the objects we intuit has more complex 
implications. 
                                                
5
 One reason for my preference for the A over the B Deduction is that in the former, 
Kant makes clear the interconnection of intuition and categorial synthesis at the outset, 
whereas in the latter he must resort to a series of footnotes to make this crucial point – 
which he apparently so took for granted that he forgot to mention it in the main text. 
The other problem with the B Deduction is that the “I think” that there has pride of 
place cannot possibly have the role in transcendental synthesis that Kant claims for it, 
since in order even to conceptualize it, transcendental synthesis must be presupposed. 
This is what comes of too great an enthusiasm for Descartes. 
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Of these implications, the most important for present purposes is that our 
relation to such objects is, indeed, unmediated by contingent, empirical 
concepts; but it is not unmediated by transcendental ones. The distinction, 
roughly, is this: Empirical concepts, are the contingent and socially 
acculturated concepts by which we identify a particular empirical object, 
event or state of affairs relative to the particular local context we ourselves 
inhabit. Other empirical concepts define that equally contingent and socially 
acculturated context itself. Empirical concepts must instantiate transcendental 
ones, because the objects and events they identify must meet the same 
necessary preconditions for experience. Those transcendental concepts or 
categories (Kant uses the terms interchangeably) are the ones enumerated 
above. These are the innate, hard-wired concepts that any concrete particular 
must instantiate in order to count as an empirical object for us in the first 
place. By describing these categories as a priori and necessary, Kant means to 
call attention to certain basic features of them. They are a priori in the sense 
that they are hardwired preconditions for having coherent experience of any 
kind. And they are necessary in two senses: first, they are necessary for 
coherent experience of empirical objects; and second, they are logically 
necessary.  
Because Kant draws the Table of Categories at A 80/B 106 from scholastic 
Aristotelian logic and tinkers idiosyncratically with them even more, these 
categories have a somewhat arbitrary and anachronistic character that lead 
most Kant commentators to regard them as an embarrassment in Kant’s 
architectonic that it would be better to ignore. But it is not necessary to ignore 
all of them; and even if it were, it would be a mistake to ignore the kernel of 
Kant’s insight that there are certain basic logical principles that any coherent 
object of empirical experience must satisfy: First, there must be properties that 
can be ascribed to it; and second, it cannot both bear and not bear those 
properties at the same time in the same respect. That is, any such object must 
satisfy the law of non-contradiction as formulated in predicate logic: 
 
(x)~(Fx.~Fx)6 
 
As Kant expresses it, 
                                                
6
 I discuss the logical status of Kant’s categories, and the distinction between 
transcendental and empirical concepts, at greater length in “Xenophobia and Kantian 
Rationalism,” Philosophical Forum XXIV, 1-3 (Fall-Spring  1992-93), 188-232.  Reprinted in 
Feminist Interpretations of Immanuel Kant, Ed. Robin May Schott (University Park: 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), 21-73; and in African-American Perspectives 
and Philosophical Traditions, Ed. John P. Pittman (New York: Routledge, 1997). 
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the categories … are concepts of an object in general, by means of which 
intuition in regard to the logical functions of judgment is seen as 
determined. Thus the function of the categorical judgment was the 
relation of subject to predicate, for example “All bodies are divisible.” (B 
128) 
The law of non-contradiction can be made out most easily in terms of Kant’s 
first category of relation (inherence and subsistence) but the others are not 
irrelevant. The significance of Kant’s claim that the transcendental categories 
are necessary in this second sense is that it is in this second sense that the 
connection between the necessity of these concepts and their empirical 
objectivity is clearest: For good reason, we do, indeed, recognize the 
objectivity of the law of non-contradiction as valid independent of our wishes, 
our will, or our existence. Kant’s claim for the objectivity of the transcendental 
categories is based on their fidelity to logical form, and it is this that enables 
him to propose them as the foundation for Newtonian science, and so for 
objective judgments about its objects of investigation. Hence there are certain 
kinds of judgments we are able to make about art objects in particular that 
have objective status as well. 
To then claim that in intuition we stand in direct and unmediated 
relationship to objects is to say, first, that we stand in direct and unmediated 
relationship to the empirical objects that intuition, with the help of the 
transcendental categories of understanding, has enabled us to construct; and 
second, that no contingent, socially acculturated empirical concepts, theories 
or interpretations stand between us and them. The objects themselves are the 
result of the mediation by the transcendental categories of the sense data that 
intuition supplies; but there is no further empirical conceptual intermediary 
between those resultant objects and us. On this reading, one can have a direct 
and unmediated relationship to such objects, and they can also find a place in 
consciousness. Intuition provides the direct access to them, and 
understanding locates them as objects in one’s unified awareness. One’s 
relationship to such objects contains elements of both. 
With this clarification in hand, let us now reconsider the case of artistic 
practice. What kind of unmediated access do artists have to the material 
objects they create? And what is the nature of the intuitive knowledge artists 
have that allows them to conjure spatiotemporally discrete objects in advance 
of any conceptual identification or interpretation of the object that might be 
invoked to explain, either to themselves or others, the significance of doing 
so? Both questions have the same answer. For reasons depending on 
idiosyncrasies of personal development or social and historical circumstance, 
artists are deficient in socialization in at least one creatively useful way: they 
are able to see through the contingent empirical concepts by which we are 
taught to make sense of our social environment, and they choose to specialize 
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in and develop this capacity. These contingent empirical concepts are the ones 
that are instilled in most of us so deeply that, other things equal, we lose the 
capacity to recognize the potential of objects, materials and states of affairs to 
transcend them. Socialization this deeply rooted leads us to assume 
unquestioningly that the rules, roles, relationships and functions of objects we 
learn in the process of acculturation are necessary ones: that a urinal can have 
only one function; that a target has only one role; that a skin color can have 
only one signification. The contingent empirical concepts in accordance with 
which we assign these unidimensional properties to objects of our experience 
mediate them not merely by interposing a conceptual scrim between us and 
them. They also constrain our thinking, about every aspect of our 
surroundings, to the familiar, mundane and conventional. 
Contemporary artists are both blessed and also cursed by their willfully 
insufficient indoctrination in these conventional empirical concepts (perhaps 
another symptom of the demise of family values). The blessing is to be able to 
see the anomalous or nonconventional potential of objects, materials and 
states of affairs that is hidden to those who are blinded by them. The curse is 
to be able to see it and indicate or actualize it, without being able to 
communicate it in familiar terms and concepts one’s audience can be expected 
to understand; to have to stand by, inwardly groaning and writhing, while 
one’s audience first ignores it; then flails about wildly, grabbing futilely and 
erroneously for some such familiar concepts with which to pin it down; and, 
finally, compresses those erroneous concepts into a twenty-five-words-or-less 
aphorism with which the work can be catalogued and dismissed. If any such 
configuration of familiar concepts and principles were in actual fact sufficient 
to communicate what an artist intuits, she would have no motive for 
producing the work. Because there is none, the work is destined for 
misunderstanding so long as her audience relies on them – as they must, in 
order to communicate with one another about the work. In this conversation, 
however, the artist is always a reluctant participant at best, having already 
said what she has to say by other means. 
Thus the case of artistic practice does suggest an account of the type of 
knowledge involved in artistic practice: An artist’s knowledge of the empirical 
object he creates is not propositional, but neither is it necessarily practical in 
any full-blooded sense. Rather, it is intuitive. That means that it is conscious 
and reflective, but nevertheless nonconceptual. It is the kind of knowledge 
one can have only when one’s access to the empirical object is direct and 
unmediated by culture-bound empirical concepts or theories.  
However, this account of artistic knowledge does not resolve the 
dilemma implied by Kant’s thesis, i.e. the mutual interconnection and 
simultaneous incompatibility of intuition and conceptual knowledge. For 
even if we confine our focus to contingent and culturally specific empirical 
concepts and theories, it remains true that either we invoke those concepts 
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and theories to explain the concrete particular objects we intuit, in which case 
we lose the direct and unmediated access to them that intuition affords; or 
else we divest ourselves of those concepts and theories in order to recover it, 
in which case we lose the ability to make discursive sense of the resulting 
contact; this is the way many artists experience the dilemma.  
But the dilemma has even more profound dimensions than this. For in 
order for intuition to bring us into unmediated relation to concrete particulars 
independent of any such conceptual knowledge, that relation itself must reach 
beyond the transcendental concepts with which even an artist’s intuitive 
knowledge is saturated. That is, it must reach the concrete particulars of 
which it is, according to Kant, true that, although we are in direct and 
unmediated intuitive contact with them, we nevertheless cannot have even 
the most minimal knowledge of them as objects; i.e. we cannot be consciously 
aware of them at all. These are the concrete particulars that Kant describes as 
noumena, or things in themselves. In order to dissect the dilemma at this level, 
we need to examine more closely Kant’s account of in what unified conscious 
awareness of objects consists.  
Kant’s conception of the basic structure of a unified consciousness – or 
transcendental unity of apperception, as he calls it – is grounded in his view of 
sense data – or, as he calls it, the transcendental manifold of intuition – as 
consisting in singular representations. Were we to provide no systematic 
organization of the representations we receive in intuition from things in 
themselves, we would have no awareness of them. For to have awareness of 
anything, be it mental or physical, is to be able to distinguish the thing we are 
conscious of from ourselves; i.e. the object of consciousness from the 
conscious subject who is aware of it. But in order to make this distinction, we 
first have to organize the representations we receive into an object distinct 
from us; and this, as we have seen above, requires that we arrange those 
representations according to the rules supplied by the categories of 
understanding (A 106, A 126). This process of organization Kant calls 
transcendental synthesis; and the essence of this notion is that we combine 
individual representations into a non-arbitrary linear sequence that is given 
by the categories. So, for example, we situate representation r1 before r2, r3 to 
follow r2, r4 to follow r3, etc., thus producing the linear sequence r1, r2, r3, r4, … 
and so on. However, this much gives us only a temporal sequence of 
representations in inner sense. Because this sequence need not meet any 
requirements of external spatial order, it can be, or seem, arbitrary, in exactly 
the way that so-called “free association” often is: thus a representation of 
dinner leads to a representation of my mother cooking, which leads to a 
representation of campfire marshmallows, which leads to a representation of 
a drive-in movie I want to see, and so on. 
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In order for this sequence to be non-arbitrary, such that it constructs an 
external object of outer sense and situates it within the stable spatiotemporal 
matrix, we must further sort these representations into kinds according to the 
rules which the categories provide. So, for example, we retain representation 
r1 in mind while situating r2 next in line, and recognize it as the same as r1; we 
retain r2 and r1 in mind while situating r3 next in line, which we recognize as 
the same as r2 and r1; and so on. In so doing, we are using the category of 
substance (inherence and subsistence) to construct out of these multiple 
representations a single object that is the same at each moment, i.e. that 
persists through time (A 99-102).  
The representations that we thus synthesize into objects of consciousness 
can have either of two origins. They can originate within us, in sensory 
reaction to our own mental processes (B 153-155); or they can originate “from 
elsewhere in intuition” (B 145). Because we can have no unmediated access to 
things in themselves, including us as we are in ourselves, we can have no way 
of knowing whether these two origins are mutually exclusive or mutually 
equivalent – i.e. whether or how many things in themselves there are. But 
what we can know is that these representations thus combine into identifiable 
mental content (B 103); that Kant uses the terms “content” and “matter” 
interchangeably (A 6, A 58/B 83); and that the “transcendental matter of 
things in themselves” is what corresponds to sensation in the subject (A 143/B 
182). Thus the representations we receive in intuition from those things, and 
organize systematically in understanding, bring us into direct intuitive 
relation to noumena, or things in themselves, even though, according to Kant, 
we can have neither awareness nor understanding of them. 
Now Kant assumes that we can have no consciousness of things in 
themselves because he ascribes consciousness solely to the coherently 
organized experience of a unified subject, i.e. of an individual ego (B 134 fn.). 
If this assumption is correct, then of course it would follow from the further 
assumption that this unity is a hardwired conceptual unity that such a unified 
subject can have no direct contact with such things that is unmediated by any 
such hardwired concepts. However, Samkhyan philosophy disputes the 
ascription of consciousness to unified subjecthood; and to dismantle the 
conceptual hardwiring that makes such contact impossible is precisely the 
goal of advanced yogic meditation.  
Samkhya contends that consciousness is a function, not of the unified 
conceptual structure of the individual subject, or ego; but rather of the data 
that individual subjects may or may not receive in intuition as representations 
and then subject to that structure. In order to appreciate the Samkhyan thesis, 
it is useful to compare its form of dualism with Cartesian dualism: 
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Both Cartesian and Samkhyan dualism make a sharp distinction between 
body and mind. Both regard the body as inherently insensate, and as 
animated by consciousness. However, whereas Cartesian dualism locates 
consciousness in the mind, Samkhyan dualism identifies the mind with the 
same mechanical and insensate matter of which the body is constituted; and 
instead locates consciousness in a state for which there is no analogue in 
Western philosophy, namely purusha. The difference between the Cartesian 
concept of mind and the Samkhyan concept of purusha is that first, Cartesian 
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dualism regards the mind as nonmaterial and conscious, whereas Samkhyan 
dualism regards it as material and unconscious; and second, Cartesian 
dualism regards consciousness as subjective and personal, whereas Samkhyan 
dualism regards it as objective and impersonal. It is because consciousness on 
the Samkhyan view is objective and impersonal, i.e. not a function of the 
individual subject’s ego-unity, that Samkhya can dispute Kant’s ascription of 
consciousness to the unified subjecthood of the individual ego. On the 
Samkhyan view, the individual ego is part of the apparatus of the mind; and 
the mind, in turn, is not inherently conscious at all. Only its animation by 
purusha makes it appear to be so.  
This is the illusion that advanced yogic meditation attempts to penetrate; 
and perhaps it is now clear why it is best not to undertake it unless and until 
one is comfortable with the imminence of one’s own death. For the process of 
penetrating the illusion of individual ego-awareness is the process of 
dismantling the conditions that purport to provide its subjective unity: the 
stable and coherent organization of its experience; the underlying conceptual 
functions that provide structure and intelligibility both to an external world 
and also to one’s self; and the synthetic unity of the representations that 
simultaneously constitute both. In order even to undertake such a project, one 
must take for granted that the dismantling or death of the ego is not 
equivalent to the death of consciousness, and therefore that the individual self 
and the consciousness that animates it are nonequivalent. One must also take 
for granted that the meditative practices by which the conceptual structure of 
the ego is dismantled will, in the end, lay bare precisely that direct and 
unmediated reality with which intuition connects us, which remains 
inaccessible to us so long as that conceptual structure remains in place. 
In this undertaking Kant’s account of synthesis at A 99-102 provides a 
detailed roadmap in reverse for both dismantling the conceptual structure of 
the individual ego, and thereby achieving direct and unmediated contact with 
things in themselves – i.e. things as they are in ultimate reality; because the 
two projects are in fact one and the same. We have seen that in these 
paragraphs of the Subjective Deduction in A, Kant describes in detail how we 
construction an enduring object out of intuitional representations that we 
situate in a non-arbitrary linear order, according to the rules provided by the 
transcendental conceptual functions. At A 109 he goes on to state explicitly 
that the very same rules that provide objective structure to an object of 
consciousness and situate it in an external world of spatiotemporal and causal 
relations also provide structure and unity to the subjective consciousness that 
contemplates it. This should not be surprising, since all along Kant’s account 
has treated of only one set of intuitional representations, not two. It is not as 
though there were one set of representations that, properly systematized, 
constituted the subjective unity of the self, and a different set that, similarly 
systematized, constituted the objective and enduring structure of the object. 
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Kant’s whole point is that there is only one set of representations that, 
properly systematized, simultaneously and interdependently constitute both. 
Tersely put, there are subjects if and only if there are objects of consciousness; 
dismantle the one and you automatically dismantle the other. 
This is why yogic meditation begins at the most elementary level with 
concentration on a physical object, and progresses to more advanced levels 
only once this one has been mastered. It is also why the familiar seven-
seconds-per artwork standard viewing time is so deeply entrenched in the 
viewing habits of the contemporary art audience. Looking, really looking at 
any object is hard work, and not just because we have so much else on our 
minds. It elicits enormous psychological resistance because the more deeply 
we penetrate into the hidden structure of the object, the more deeply we 
penetrate into the hidden structure of the self. The more fully and vividly we 
unpack the complex properties of the object, the more fully and vividly we 
take apart the complex structuring of the self. And the more intensely we are 
confronted with the concrete particularity of the object, the more we are 
brought face-to-face with the boundaries and limitations of an individual ego 
beyond which we rightly fear to venture. So in the end, no, there is no 
solution to the dilemma Kant’s thesis engenders. The reason we cannot have 
both direct intuitive contact with and conscious knowledge of the ultimate 
reality of concrete particulars in themselves is that we would have to sacrifice 
our concrete particular ego-selves in order to enjoy it. That is a price that most 
art viewers are unwilling to pay. 
